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RES PUBLICA:  PUBLIC OPINION, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S 2010 TERM 
Bruce G. Peabody* & Peter J. Woolley** 
INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2011, Fairleigh Dickinson University’s polling 
organization, PublicMind, conducted a national survey on the substantive 
issues underlying four constitutional cases decided during the 2010 
Supreme Court term.  These cases involved an array of specific legal 
problems, including those posed by state tax credits for donations 
supporting religious schools, questioning of minors without parental 
consent, prison overcrowding, and the appropriate regulation of violent 
video games.  More broadly, they encompassed many of the most charged 
and salient areas of contemporary constitutional discussion including 
federalism, free speech, and criminal procedure. 
While it is not particularly unusual to ask the public about its views on 
previously decided cases or established areas of constitutional controversy, 
the PublicMind polls were conducted before the pertinent cases were 
decided.  Additionally, each case presented a novel legal issue.  In this way, 
the polls were intended to provide a measure of the public’s views of the 
substantive questions at issue and not public opinion about cases already 
decided by the Supreme Court. 
In this Essay for Fordham Law Review’s Res Gestae, we present these 
cases and our polling results, with three primary goals.  In Part I we make 
the case for the utility and importance of examining the public’s views on 
these issues, a perspective that may not be obvious to many readers.  In Part 
II we highlight the cases considered and their significance—both on their 
own and in the context of understanding the Court’s 2010 term as a whole.  
Finally, we present our results with the hope that readers will take these 
findings seriously and consider additional ways in which one might explore 
the relationship between the public’s views, constitutional law, and the 
cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
*  Bruce G. Peabody is Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University. 
**  Peter J. Woolley is Executive Director, PublicMind and Professor of Comparative 
Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University. 
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I.  EXPLAINING THE INTERSECTION OF POLLING AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW:  THE “GOVERNANCE AS DIALOGUE” MOVEMENT 
At first glance, the prospect of polling the public on the constitutional 
issues in pending Supreme Court cases seems dubious—possibly even 
subversive of cherished legal values.  According to traditional if not 
orthodox narratives dating back as far as The Federalist Papers, the 
Supreme Court is insulated through life tenure, salary protection, and other 
guarantees in Article III of the Constitution, from both the executive and 
legislative branches and the “occasional ill humors” that course through 
society and the public.1  Turning to public opinion on constitutional matters 
might seem to threaten this structural divide between the people and their 
judicial agents.  In turn, a move like this could impede the Court’s ability to 
ensure “a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws” and 
protect “the rights of citizens.”2   
 But our interest in the public’s views on constitutional issues has a 
different backdrop, with a different set of assumptions about the Court.  
Since the 1960s, a rising chorus of scholarly voices has contributed to a 
“governance as dialogue” movement, which presumes we must appreciate 
the different contributions of Congress, the executive branch, the states, 
organized interests, and the people as a whole in order to comprehend the 
Constitution’s evolving place in our lives.3  Constitutional meaning, in this 
picture, is formed by an intricate “dialogue” amongst many participants, a 
political and legal back and forth in which the courts are just one, albeit 
important, player.4 
The governance as dialogue literature is diverse and growing.  But 
surveying the public’s views on emerging constitutional issues can play a 
valuable orienting role in this somewhat crowded scholarly thicket.  
Specifically, our recent polling efforts can assist researchers in four broad 
areas of inquiry. 
A.  Popular Constitutionalism and Surveys of the Public 
First, polling the public can be an important part of identifying the 
contours of “popular constitutionalism”—the public’s ability to engage and 
discuss constitutional issues.  Whatever interest we might have in 
appraising the impact of the “public” on constitutional decisions, it can be 
challenging to identify precisely what this phenomenon references or 
includes.5  Who are “the People” to whom we devote so much political and 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL:  INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009) (discussing “governance as 
dialogue”). 
 4. See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:  INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL 
PROCESS 231–47 (1988) (discussing “coordinate construction” as constitutional 
interpretation by all three branches of federal government). 
 5. See William E. Forbath, The Will of the People?  Pollsters, Elites, and Other 
Difficulties, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1191, 1193–94 (2010) (“‘The People’ is a fiction”). 
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rhetorical attention?  Developing and presenting polling results provides a 
limited, incomplete, but also concrete and replicable measure of what a 
statistically valid sample of American voters believes about a set of issues.  
With this approach, the devil we know can be far more valuable than the 
devil we think we know but can only vaguely allude to. 
Having helped identify the public, polling can deepen our understanding 
of the degree to which the people as a whole seem engaged on 
constitutional issues and capable of cogently discussing them.  Scholars like 
Larry Kramer fret that the rise of “judicial supremacy” has diminished the 
public’s engagement with and ownership of our supreme law.6  Polling can 
establish at least some of the parameters and referents for assessing these 
concerns.  In addition to the question of how much “dialogue” there is 
between courts and the public, we also need a more complex account about 
the nature, salience, and evolution of popular speech on constitutional 
issues, and polling can assist in this regard. 
B.  The Value of Polls in Understanding Supreme Court Decisions 
A second contribution of polling is to advance scholarly understanding 
about the extent to which the public shapes the constitutional decisions of 
the Supreme Court.  Much of the work here has concluded that there is 
substantial “covariation between the public’s ideological position and Court 
policy,”7 that is, a fairly close tracking between the decisions of the Court 
and the views of the public especially where the latter are stable and 
relatively well defined.  As one scholar concluded, over its history “the 
Court has seldom lagged far behind or forged far ahead” of public opinion.8 
Of course, these observations, even if accurate, raise the question:  what 
explains this correspondence?  Scholars have attempted to answer this 
query by investigating whether the views of the public impact the Court 
through a spectrum of direct or indirect means—examining everything from 
the public’s influence on political elites, to the play of public opinion in 
selecting justices, to the place of popular majorities in shaping the kinds of 
cases that emerge from lower courts and how legal issues are presented.9 
 
 6. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (discussing how judicial supremacy is the doctrine that the 
courts have ultimate if not exclusive authority over constitutional questions). 
 7. Lawrence Baum, Jeff Yates’ Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the 
Supreme Court, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 367, 370 (2005) (book review). 
 8. ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (5th ed. 1960). See also 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 383 (2009) (“Over time, 
sometimes a long period, public opinion jells, and the Court comes into line with the 
considered views of the American public.”); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 192–93 (1989) (discussing the correlation between public opinion polls 
taken during the Rehnquist Court and the results in most of those Court’s decisions). 
 9. See, e.g., JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 116 
(1995) (reviewing the influence of public opinion on the Senate and the Supreme Court 
appointment process); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court 
Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 89 (1993) (discussing the justices’ broad awareness of 
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We also note that while there is a substantial amount of polling data 
pertaining to constitutional areas widely recognized as important, such as 
abortion, gun control, and affirmative action, we are not aware of any 
systematic effort to identify and track opinions on nascent or developing 
controversies.  Taking the public’s pulse on these issues can play a valuable 
part in corroborating or suggesting limits to the “covariation” claim—that 
the Court largely follows the broad outlines of public opinion.10  Stated 
somewhat differently, these polls can create a clearer picture of when the 
public’s influence on the Court is likely to be strong or weak, with the latter 
perhaps including conditions such as when an issue has a low national 
profile, or where the public’s views are ambivalent or sharply divided. 
Survey research might also help identify plausible “tipping points” or the 
initial circumstances in which it seems likely that the public’s views on 
developing constitutional debates can have an impact on the Court and its 
rulings. 
In addition, a poll-based approach to understanding the public’s 
constitutional views is valuable because the results can be broken down into 
different demographic and political subgroups.  A strong case can be made 
that in our diverse, complex, far-flung republic, the American people can be 
best understood as multiple publics, and that, rather than “majority rule” we 
have “minorities rule, where one aggregation of minorities achieves policies 
opposed by another aggregation.”11  Seen in this light, our capacity to use 
polling to identify the views of subgroups in American politics can give us 
unique insight into society’s struggles to shape Supreme Court decisions 
and constitutional meaning. 
Finally, one might also note that the Court itself sometimes invokes the 
public’s purported beliefs, by occasionally citing polls when defending its 
reasoning and legal opinions.12  Thus, having a record of reliable polling 
 
public opinion and the willingness of some to “adjust” their decisions accordingly); William 
B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v. Knott:  Judicial Policy 
Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135, 162 (2007) (making the 
case that public opinion shaped how civil rights cases involving gays and lesbians came 
before the Court); see also MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 193–95 (setting out numerous 
models through which public opinion might influence Court rulings). 
 10. For example, one area where there may be a divergence between the public and a 
Court ruling involves campaign finance and the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). See Impressions of the Citizens United 
Decision and a Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Overturn It, HART RESEARCH 
ASSOCS. (Jan. 20, 2011), http://freespeechforpeople.org/sites/default/files/me10129b
_public.pdf (finding that a majority of Americans favor a constitutional amendment to 
overturn the decision). 
 11. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957). 
 12. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (referencing the views of the public in 
opposing the implementation of the death penalty for the mentally retarded); Trop v. Dulles, 
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (relying on the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society”). See generally Susan J. Becker, Many Are Chilled, but Few Are Frozen:  
How Transformative Learning in Popular Culture, Christianity, and Science Will Lead to the 
Eventual Demise of Legally Sanctioned Discrimination Against Sexual Minorities in the 
United States, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177, 186 (2006) (discussing Justice 
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results can help to substantiate, challenge, and contextualize the Court’s 
own invocations of the “will of the people.” 
C.  Polling and the Court’s Influence 
In addition to scholarly work examining the public’s impact on the Court, a 
third set of studies has essentially inversed this relationship, considering 
instead how the Court’s rulings affect the public’s views on constitutional 
issues or about the Court itself.  Broadly speaking, the consensus from these 
studies is that Supreme Court decisions do not have much influence on 
American public opinion.  If there is a “dialogue” between courts and 
citizens, there is not much evidence the Supreme Court is effectively 
leading this discussion—given, among other factors, the inscrutability and 
low profile of most Court opinions to most citizens.13  Notwithstanding 
these observations, using our polling results to reexamine the nexus 
between Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion is still 
valuable.  Judges, politicians, and educators continue to insist that the Court 
serves as a leader in informing the public about constitutional protections 
and rights.  Therefore, setting out the public’s views on constitutional 
matters prior to related Court rulings, and analyzing whether these views 
are subsequently altered, would further test what has sometimes been called 
the “Court as republican schoolmaster” thesis.14 
More broadly, even while acknowledging that for many constitutional 
areas, the Supreme Court has no impact on public opinion, Nathaniel 
Persily argues that there may be circumstances in which the relationship is 
more complex.15  Some Court decisions can lead to public “legitimation,” 
shifting support in the direction of the Court’s decision, “backlash,” 
objections to a decision simply because the Court has issued it, and 
“polarization,” shifting views amongst different subgroups comprising “the 
public.”16  These reactions seem to be issue- and even case-specific, an 
example being how public opinion on “discretionary” abortions not related 
to maternal health became more divided after Roe v. Wade.17  Therefore, 
keeping tabs on the public’s views about constitutional matters before and 
after a Court decision remains essential for teasing out the perhaps special 
conditions under which our highest tribunal impacts popular viewpoints.18 
 
Scalia’s invocation of public opinion about “persons who openly engage in homosexual 
conduct”). 
 13. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 8 (Jack Citrin et al. eds., 
2008) (contending that in “the vast majority of the cases . . . Supreme Court decisions had no 
effect on the overall distribution of public opinion”). 
 14. Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster:  The U.S. 
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 751–52 (1989) 
(discussing the idea that the Court serves as a “republican schoolmaster” to the nation on 
constitutional and legal issues). 
 15. See PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 13, at 8. 
 16. See id. 
 17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 18. See Franklin & Kosaki, supra note 14, at 763–65 (discussing polling results about 
the public’s views on abortion following Roe). 
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D.  Normative Questions and Beyond 
A fourth and final application of polling to questions about 
“constitutional dialogues” in society involves normative questions.  For 
example, we might wonder about the wider significance of today’s public 
conversations about constitutional meaning, including the association, if 
any, of popular constitutionalism with civic engagement.  In addition, 
public opinion about constitutional issues raises separate questions about 
the most appropriate ways in which courts can identify and use this 
information.  Polling can be a useful tool in assessing the quality and 
coherence of popular discourse on constitutional matters, and the extent to 
which the public may need education about important constitutional 
topics.19  Somewhat conversely, poll results may upset the conventional 
wisdom about the public’s purported ignorance on constitutional matters, or 
at least suggest we need new ways to discuss and evaluate constitutional 
literacy. 
It should also be noted that the “governance as dialogue” debate about 
the relative importance and specific content of the public’s constitutional 
beliefs does not exhaust the potential value of polling on emerging legal 
issues.  This information can also be useful, for example, in attempting to 
understand a particular Court’s place and status in “political time”—that is, 
in assessing its relative strength or vulnerability vis-à-vis the other branches 
of government and in evaluating whether the Court is affiliated with or 
departs from the prevalent political regime.20  Stated somewhat differently, 
polls can help give us a reading of overall political conditions facing a 
Court and whether its opinions are consonant with the public and opinion 
leaders, or whether they instead suggest it may be out of step with the rest 
of the nation, perhaps as a result of political realignment.21  Polling can also 
help scholars wrestle with related questions of implementation:  what are 
the conditions under which Supreme Court opinions are likely to be 
followed or transformed “on the ground,” viz., when legal commands need 
to be put into action. 
II.  FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The previous discussion underscores the intellectual utility and propriety 
of polling the public on emerging constitutional controversies.  What were 
the actual findings with respect to popular views on pending issues from the 
2010 term? 
 
 19. For one example pointing to the public’s somewhat mixed understanding of 
constitutionalism and constitutional law, see Michael C. Dorf, Whose Constitution Is It 
Anyway?  What Americans Don’t Know About Our Constitution—and Why it Matters, 
FINDLAW (May 29, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020529.html. 
 20. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:  LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN 
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 30 (1997) (discussing “political time”). 
 21. See Charles Geyh, The Choreography of Courts-Congress Conflicts, in THE POLITICS 
OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE:  COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC 19–44 (Bruce Peabody ed., 
2010) (discussing the role of critical realignments in placing the Supreme Court at odds with 
Congress). 
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At the outset one might note that our cases can be divided into two 
groups.  In the first set, including Arizona Christian School Tuition 
Organization v. Winn22 and Camreta v. Greene,23 the Court declined to rule 
on the merits, instead handing down essentially procedural and 
jurisdictional decisions.  Our ability to analyze these cases and how they 
relate to public opinion differs from the second group, Brown v. Plata24 and 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,25 in which the Supreme Court 
handed down majority opinions on the substantive questions at issue. 
A.  Cases Not Decided on the Merits 
Arizona Christian is a good place to begin because it highlights partisan 
differences in the public’s views, as well as a degree of intuitive self-
interest amongst voters.26  The case dealt with the use of state tax credits to 
offset donations to school tuition organizations, which in turn provided 
scholarships to students attending private, religious schools.  
Seven in ten voters reported they never heard of Arizona Christian or the 
accompanying controversy but, despite that, 86 percent of respondents 
offered a definite opinion about the case, while only 14 percent said they 
were unsure or had mixed views.27  
Democrats were twice as likely as Republicans28 to say that Arizona's tax 
credits for supporting private schools, including religiously affiliated 
schools, created a policy that supported religious schools.29  The partisan 
difference is remarkable given that the case, like many others, was not 
regularly in the news or talked about by party officials; in other words, 
voters’ views on this issue are unlikely to reflect cues taken from opinion 
leaders.  We also note that partisan divisions amongst voters on this issue 
arguably reflected divisions amongst the justices.  The Court’s 5-4 decision 
 
 22. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 23. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 24. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 25. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 26. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release, 
PublicMind, Public Blesses Arizona Christian School Tuition (April 4, 2011), 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/taxcredits/.  
 27. The willingness of voters to weigh in on a case, despite their lack of familiarity with 
it, might point to the capacity of polls to generate opinions that did not previously exist.  
This critique that citizens do not navigate through life with polling categories in mind, and 
therefore that surveys “create” voter views as much as they reflect them, is an objection we 
discuss in our companion piece. See Peter J. Woolley & Bruce G. Peabody, Polls, the Public, 
and Popular Perspectives on Constitutional Issues, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 22, 27 
(2011). 
 28.  In our polls, partisanship was self-identified, that is, respondents placed themselves 
in a particular party or no party at all.  
 29. In asking our respondents about Arizona Christian, we sought to avoid entanglement 
with some of the complexities of the Arizona tuition policy by focusing on “parents who 
send their children to private schools, including schools with religious affiliations.” Press 
Release, supra note 26.  Strictly speaking, however, any citizens were eligible to donate to 
“student tuition organizations” and receive tax credits.  Thus, in this case, our effort to 
provide an accessible poll question came with the price of not achieving complete accuracy 
in describing the underlying state policy. 
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held that the challengers to the Arizona tax credit law lacked standing to 
sue, with the consequence that the policy was allowed to stand.  This result 
was formed by a majority comprised of the Court’s conservative justices, 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and the more moderate Justice Kennedy.  
The Court’s liberal wing dissented.  Given the substantial degree of Court 
division on this “partisan” dimension throughout the 2010 term, Arizona 
Christian is something of a bellwether.30 
  Another intriguing finding in this case is how the results indicate that 
different age cohorts have distinctive views.  Voters aged 30 to 44 were 
only half as likely as other age groups to say that the tax credits essentially 
support religious schools, and they were significantly more likely than other 
age groups to say the tax credits support parents’ right to choose schools.  
Perhaps not coincidently, this age group includes parents rearing school-age 
children.  This result also suggests respondents are able to discern a certain 
self-interest in the answer categories, despite a lack of knowledge about the 
case. 
Overall, the results in Arizona Christian, with three in five voters 
supporting Arizona’s credit system for religious schools, indicate that the 
public’s views on this matter have changed substantially since the late 
nineteenth century, when a majority of states passed laws restricting and 
even prohibiting the use of public funds by parochial schools.31 
The second, “procedurally decided” case concerned an issue of the 
criminal justice system and uncovered differences in views by both 
ethnicity and gender.  Camreta involved a nine-year-old girl in Oregon who 
was questioned for two hours by a deputy sheriff and a social worker about 
possible sexual abuse by her father.32  The questioning took place without a 
court order and without the mother’s knowledge.33 
Again, and not surprisingly, the overwhelming number of voters, more 
than four in five, reported not having heard anything about the case.  
However, only 13 percent said they were unsure or “mixed” in their opinion 
on the dispute.34  Nearly three in five of our respondents said the parents 
must be informed unless there is a court order or immediate danger, while 
only one in three said a minor had to be questioned without permission, 
given the possible abuse at home.35 
 
 30. SCOTUSblog reports that during the 2010 term, the “Court split along traditional 
ideological lines in an incredible 87% of 5-4 decisions, the highest rate in the last ten years,” 
Kedar Bhatia, Final October Term 2010 Stat Pack Available, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2011, 
5:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/final-october-term-2010-stat-pack-available. 
 31. William W. Bassett, Changing Perceptions of Private Religious Schools:  Public 
Money and Public Trust in the Education of Children, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REV. 243, 247–48. 
 32. 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2021–24 (2011). 
 33. See id. 
 34. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release, 
PublicMind, U.S. Public Rejects Interrogation of Minors Without Parental Knowledge—
Even when Domestic Abuse Is Suspected (May 26, 2011), 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/4thamend. 
 35. Our respondents were not told the age of the child out of concern that limiting the 
question to a particular age would also limit the ability to generalize the results. 
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Interestingly, in this case, there were no differences in either partisanship 
or ideology.  In other words, Republicans were just as likely as Democrats 
to agree with informing the parents, and self-described liberals were just as 
likely as conservatives to say parents should be informed.  The differences 
that did emerge were, first, in gender:  women were considerably more 
likely than men to say the authorities should be permitted to interrogate the 
child because the questioning is about abuse at home.  While further study 
is needed, these preliminary results may point to society’s continued 
associations with women and mothers as the primary “protectors” of 
children, and may also reflect a pragmatic awareness in female respondents 
that the initiators of domestic violence and sexual abuse are most likely to 
be males who are often related to the victim.36 
At the same time, non-whites were significantly less likely than whites to 
say that authorities should proceed to interrogate the child and more likely 
than whites to say the parents need to be informed.  These results could 
reflect more general suspicions by many non-white citizens about the good 
intentions and performance of law enforcement.37 
B.  Cases Decided on the Merits 
Plata is another criminal justice case, concerning California’s prison 
overcrowding.38  Perhaps predictably, given the general shift towards 
greater conservatism in criminal justice matters over the past half century, 
the public was overwhelmingly against a court-ordered release of prisoners:  
63 percent said that even if conditions in the prisons were bad, the Court 
should not order a release of “criminals.”  Only 25 percent agreed with the 
proposition that the prisons were so overcrowded, and conditions so bad, 
that some prisoners should be let go.39 
Plata also brought out the public’s partisan leanings, as well as the 
Court’s.  Self-described conservatives were more likely than the general 
public to be against prisoner release, opposed by a margin of 74 to 16 
percent.  Meanwhile, self-described liberals were more ambivalent, with 40 
 
 36.  See Ryan C. W. Hall and Richard C. W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, 
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 459 (2007) (reviewing data showing that males were the most 
frequent pedophilia offenders and that “[f]ifty percent of offenses committed against 
children younger than 6 years were committed by a family member, as were 42% of acts 
committed against children 6 to 11 years old”); Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Married Parents’ Use of Time, 2003–06 (May 8, 2008), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
pdf/atus2.pdf (reviewing data showing that “[m]arried mothers employed full time were 
more likely to . . . provide childcare on an average day” than their male spouses). 
 37. This finding is also reflected in other PublicMind surveys. See, e.g., Press Release, 
PublicMind, Trusting the System:  Democrats vs. Republicans (Oct. 17, 2006), 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/cj0610; Press Release, PublicMind, Blacks and Whites Differ on 
Trust in State’s Criminal Justice System (July 24, 2006), 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/blackwhitetrust. 
 38. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 39. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release, 
PublicMind, U.S. Voters Weigh in on Brown v. Plata:  Case Concerning Prison 
Overcrowding (May 23, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/brownvplata. 
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percent recommending prisoner release and 48 percent not recommending 
release.  The public’s ideological differences were largely reflected in the 
split of the Court.  Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion, joined 
by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg.  Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, Alito and Roberts dissented.  Justice Scalia’s dissent may have 
captured the seemingly strong judgments of the public on this issue:  “One 
would think that, before allowing the decree of a federal district court to 
release 46,000 convicted felons, this Court would bend every effort to read 
the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous result.”40 
Like Camreta, Plata also yielded interesting findings on gender and race.  
African Americans were twice as likely as whites to recommend some 
prisoners be released.  Meanwhile, there was no statistical difference 
between white and Latino respondents.  But there was a difference between 
men and women.  Men were 50 percent more likely than women to 
recommend prisoner release, with one in three men saying some should be 
let go, but only one in five women.  At least two explanations may account 
for these differences.  First, we might speculate that given the 
disproportionate amount of males in the penal system, men are more likely 
to have some sympathy for ameliorating poor prison conditions.  This 
hypothesis would need more corroboration since we do not generally find 
greater leniency amongst men on criminal justice matters.  Alternatively, 
the different views may reflect varied assessments of the risk posed by the 
potential release of thousands of prisoners back into society. 
The final case we polled, Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,41 involved 
parental prerogatives like Camreta, but the results leaned in a very different 
direction.  The core question in the case was whether the state should be 
able to regulate the sale of violent video games to minors the way it already 
controls cigarettes and alcohol, or whether it is parents who should decide 
what video games their children consume.  Rather than wanting to retain 
parental supervision, voters weighing in on the “violent video game” case 
tended to support the state’s authority to regulate products deemed harmful 
to children.42   
Just 39 percent of voters preferred leaving video game supervision to 
parents, with 57 percent saying the state should step in.  There was no 
difference between Republicans and Democrats on the question, but 
political independents were significantly more likely than partisans to say 
the state should regulate video game sales.  In addition, women, more likely 
to be the primary caregiver to children than men, were also more likely to 
favor state regulation.  To some degree these results echo the gender 
differences in Camreta, in which women were more likely than men to 
allow the state to interrogate minors without parental permission.  On the 
 
 40. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 41. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 42. For complete results, including question wording and tables, see Press Release, 
PublicMind, U.S. Public Says Regulate Violent Video Games, the Focus of Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants (June 6, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/vmerchants. 
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other hand, voters under 45 were more likely than those over 45 to think 
parents should have the role of regulating video game consumption. 
CONCLUSION 
Our venture into public polling on emerging constitutional controversies 
is preliminary and only suggestive.  Nevertheless, in addition to the specific 
observations noted above, we point to several broader conclusions from our 
cases. 
To begin, we are encouraged that the polls suggest the public’s capacity 
for a wider conversation about constitutional matters.  Despite voters’ lack 
of knowledge of, and information about, specific cases, they were willing 
and largely able to decide how they felt about the substantive issues in those 
cases.  Partly related, and corroborating our judgment that we have selected 
suitable cases for exploring the “government as dialogue” thesis, we note 
that the featured Court decisions have already prompted discussion and 
debate amongst elected officials and private citizens over the constitutional 
issues at hand.43 
Second, the public’s perspective on the constitutional issues we surveyed 
does not obviously and consistently track party, ideology, or attitudes 
towards government.  While partisanship was an important factor in the 
public’s views on tax credits and prisoner release, it was not a factor in the 
violent video game case or the question of interrogating minors without 
parental consent.  Somewhat similarly, of the three cases touching on 
parental prerogatives, the Camreta findings rejected the state’s authority, 
the Entertainment Merchants Ass’n findings endorsed the state’s authority, 
and the Arizona Christian findings offered a mixed decision, with those 
polled endorsing the ability of states to incentivize school choice.  Strong 
public support for regulation of video games and continued detention of 
prisoners arguably points to widespread embrace of the “core” government 
function of protecting citizens against violence.  But, in any event, this 
speculation and our results suggest we may need a different vocabulary and 
set of metrics for describing the public perspective on constitutional issues, 
something distinct from our traditional “left-right” nomenclature or partisan 
categories. 
We conclude by noting that two of our cases represent examples where 
the Court could be seen as pitted against the public in a prominent way.  In 
both Plata and Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, the Court entered 
judgments that were at odds with what a clear majority of the public 
favored.  Of these two cases, however, we think only one has a plausible 
chance of being a source of persistent conflict between the high bench and 
private citizens. 
 
 43. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Reject Ban on Violent Video Games for Children, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A1 (quoting the chief executive of a major video game 
developer who praised the Court for affirming “the constitutional rights of game developers” 
along with the rights of parents and “store owners”); Dan Lungren, Op-Ed., Another View:  
Releasing Prisoners Has a Violent Precedent, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 29, 2011, at 3E 
(arguing against overturning the video game regulation law). 
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 The violent video game case is part of a pattern of sometimes unpopular 
“free speech” cases that have not produced entrenched popular hostility, 
because the issues have a temporary political shelf life and the interested 
parties often make modifications of the challenged policies to accommodate 
judicial concerns.44  But Plata, and its underlying value choice, is less 
likely to go away.  Given the inevitability of crime, the enduring popularity 
of incarceration as a political strategy, and the likelihood that state budgets 
will remain strained for the foreseeable future, additional decisions like 
Plata could produce greater tension between the courts and the public.  This 
is especially true because this is an issue politicians are likely to happily 
cede to the courts—putting judges, not elected officials, in the way of an 
inflamed public.  On the other hand, this case may turn out to be the 
exception that proves the rule, and it would not surprise us to see future 
courts once again falling in line with the public and backing away from the 
Plata precedent.  But either way, we will only know what we know because 
of our measure of the public’s opinion on emerging constitutional issues, an 
initiative we look forward to carrying into the future.  
 
 44. See Press Release, Senator Leland Yee, U.S. Supreme Court Puts Corporate Interests 
Before Protecting Kids (June 27, 2011), http://dist08.casen.govoffice.com/
index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BEFA496BC-EDC8-4E38-9CC7-
68D37AC03DFF%7D&DE=%7B25F3EB3A-3F71-4121-9107-1D6B06F65872%7D 
(pledging to examine whether a more narrowly tailored law might pass the Court’s review). 
